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R. DIAS enhance their own power.4 Kabuku's main concernwas to maximize his power within the framework of colonial society and politics, and for a brief period after i873 he succeeded in dominating much economic and political life in the Cambambe region. During this time his career was not unlike those of some other African leaders whose interests temporarily coincided with those of colonial administrations while clashing with the interests of white colonists and traders.5
The Setting: Portuguese and African Society near the Kwanza in the later nineteenth century
In the nineteenth century the Mbundu tribes under colonial rule to the north of the river Kwanza were divided into numerous chiefdoms, or sobados, of widely varying political significance, whose rulers were known to the Portuguese as sobas.6 Their population was highly mobile: especially near Cambambe, where rainfall was irregular and starvation a constant threat, a temporary dispersal of people from this area to all parts of the interior seems to have occurred annually, in the dry season.7 Most people were farmers. In a good year of rain much of the soil in the concelho of Cambambe was said to be fertile, producing the basic subsistence crops of manioc and maize, as well as small amounts of rice and beans by the i86os.8 Cattle were also very important as a source of wealth. Despite its declining economic significance before I700, the Kwanza valley had remained an important corridor for Portuguese colonial activity and penetration of the interior, attracting a continuous flow of outsiders who traded European cloth, firearms and aguardente ('fire water', i.e. brandy or rum) in exchange for ivory and slaves. With the outlawing of the Atlantic slave trade and the expansion of 'legitimate' commerce, in the early nineteenth century, it began to experience an economic revival. Two developments among the many social and economic changes taking place in the Kwanza region during this period of renewed economic 6 In the nineteenth century the concelho of Cambambe (see map) included twenty-nin sobados within its jurisdiction, lying between the rivers Lukala and Kwanza.
7Information about this dispersal of population comes from the letters and relatodrio of colonial officials and sobas scattered through the avulsos and cddices of the AHA Colonial administrators themselves admitted the impossibility of arriving at an exac statistical knowledge of the black population of the interior and no reliable estima exists for the concelho of Cambambe at any moment in the nineteenth century. Se particularly, AHA, c6dice 5-6-3, oficio no. 6o6, Jose Vieira da Silva, administrator The commercial exploitation of coffee by both African and European farmers increased rapidly in the Cazengo district after I850, soon becoming the principal branch of local agriculture.10 Great diversity of agricultural organization probably existed at this date. Coffee grew wild throughout the concelho and much that was sold and exported from there was probably collected in the virgin forests which covered most of the countryside. At the same time coffee was also being planted by African cultivators,
including some sobas, a number of whom apparently acquired concessions of land from the Portuguese government in the i85OS.11 Already by I870, however, these were overshadowed by several large-scale European plantations, or fazendas, run on slave labour. 12 The development of plantation agriculture in Cazengo and throughout the Kwanza valley was linked to the growing prosperity of Dondo. The feira of Dondo had long been a slave trading centre and the European fazendas of Cazengo and neighbouring regions were probably founded with slaves purchased there.13 By the I87os a growing number of European traders resident in Dondo owned or rented coffee fazendas in Cazengo.
At this date much of the commerce in the harvested coffee was concentrated in the hands of Dondo trading houses established in Caculo. From here the sacks of coffee were carried on the shoulders of Bailundu carregadores and ferried across the Lukala on their way to Dondo, where they awaited shipment to Luanda.14 9 The separate district of Cazengo, including about thirty sobados to the north of the Lukala, was created between I840 and I845. It became a concelho in I857: see Mario Milheiros, Indice Hist6rico-Corogrdfico de Angola (Luanda, 1972), 9.
10 See AHA, c6dice G (5) 3-33, relatodrio, fo. 28. 12 In the I86os there were three important coffee plantations owned by Europeans: Col6nia and Palmira, situated in or near the sobado of Ndala Tando, between Golungo Alto and Ambaca; and Prototipo, which lay near the sobado of Kakulu Kamuinsa on the north bank of the Lukala. They are described in the governor-general's relatdrio of c. 1868 and an account of their development up to I884 is given in Carvalho, Viagem, I, I20-4.
13 The owner of the first successful coffee plantation in Cazengo, a Brazilian immigrant called Joao Guilherme Pereira Barboza, later told how, on his arrival from Brazil in the I830s, he went to Dondo to buy twenty-five slaves with which to begin the plantation: see Boletim Official de Angola, no. 8, i Nov. I845.
14 The importance of the coffee boom in Dondo's prosperity was emphasized in an editorial article published in 0 Mercantil, no. 55, 20 July I87I. The construction of a new Dondo's importance by the mid-nineteenth century grew out of its favourable position on the right bank of the Kwanza: with the expansion of 'legitimate' commerce the relative cheapness and ease of river transport assumed a new significance and the decade which followed the initiation of a regular steamship service between Dondo and Luanda in I867 witnessed a spectacular expansion in Dondo's trade and population. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were between thirty and forty European commercial establishments in Dondo, several of which were branches of larger Luanda houses.15 A close trading network linked these firms with branches in Cazengo, Pungu a Ndongo and Malange, the transport of goods between these points being almost entirely provided by Ovimbundu carregadores by i880.16 At this date hundreds of people from all parts of the interior were also entering Dondo daily to trade, sometimes travelling long distances on foot along the trails which led to their destination.17
Three major trade routes from the interior converged on Dondo in the nineteenth century: from the Lunda kingdom, in the far northeast, ivory, wax, salt and rubber passed by way of Kasanje and Malange to Pungu a Ndongo, thence following a path along the right bank of the Kwanza to Dondo; from the Ovimbundu plateau, south of the Kwanza, a trail led northwards through Libolo as far as the river, bringing wax, rubber, palm oil and slaves; finally a third route from the lands of Jinga, to the north of the Lukala, led south-westwards through the fertile hinterlands of Ambaca and Cazengo, bringing cereals, groundnuts and coffee.
As European demand for these goods rose after I870 Dondo became increasingly important, not only as a centre of direct commerce and reciprocal transactions with the interior, but also as an entrepot for imported European goods and for the agricultural products of neighbouring regions.18
The enthusiasm of nineteenth-century Portuguese sources makes it road between Dondo and Caculo, the administrative centre of Cazengo, was begun in I877. 15 This estimate is taken from the census lists (recenseamentos) of citizens eligible to vote for deputies to represent Angola in the Cortes Gerais in Lisbon between 1875 and i886, found in the AHA, avulsos, macos 23-I-I, 23-1-3, 23-1-4, 23-2--I, 23-6-3, 23-9-4. In I899 a total of 5 1 firms were listed in Dondo: see AHA, avulsos, mayo I 6-9-4. According to Carvalho the number of Luanda firms represented in Dondo declined with the increase in its economic importance and the consequent growth of independent establishments: see Carvalho, Viagem, i, 102. The increase in the volume of trade entering the concelho of Cambambe from the mid-nineteenth century onwards enhanced the economic and political significance of sobados bordering or straddling the main routes leading to and from Dondo. Although some sobas apparently participated directly in trading activities,20 most of the chiefs in the concelho probably derived their main advantage from the interception of trade flowing to Dondo through their control of ports and passage across rivers and from the illegal exaction of tribute from traders entering their territories.21 In addition Portuguese sources suggest that some sobas also profited from the robbery and plunder of trading caravans. The insecurity of trade routes grew in the i870s.22 This was aggravated by frequent armed hostilities among African chiefs, during which even the rumour of an intended war was sufficient to cause a panic and halt the flow of commerce into the concelho.
All these activities by sobas and their people prejudiced European commerce and helped to create a conflict of interest between black rulers and the white trading communities of Dondo and Cazengo. Although the size of these communities was probably insignificant in relation to the total population, the increase in the number of Europeans, induced to settle in the Kwanza valley by its growing agricultural and commercial prosperity, was relatively sudden and important in terms of the history of that region. By i88o agriculture and trade along the Kwanza and Lukala rivers were coming to be dominated by a handful of wealthy white colonists, most of whom were newcomers within the last ten years. It is likely that the social and political organization of the western Mbundu in the nineteenth century bore many resemblances to that of other systems included within the so-called 'matrilineal' belt of central African peoples to which they belonged. The main political units of each sobado were the villages, or sanzalas, inhabited by a mixture of free blacks and 'slaves', called muleke. The sanzalas 'belonged' to individuals, described as patroes in Portuguese sources, who were probably lineage headmen, the principal sanzala serving as the capital, or mbanza, of the sobado, where the soba himself lived.
The succession of sobas had both elective and hereditary features. In each sobado a small group of counsellors, or makota, elected a new chief, usually from the same descent group as the preceding soba.30 The supremacy of the royal lineage within each sobado seems to have rested on a combination of material and spiritual superiority. In common with many other African rulers sobas exerted their control by this date chiefly through command over slaves, supplies of arms and gunpowder and wealth from imported European goods, such as wine and cloth.31 Moral and spiritual superiority was conferred on them through the possession of relics belonging to the sobado, possibly the bones of their predecessors. However, their power was far from absolute: the makota retained the right to depose a ruler, replacing him by another, should he desert the sobado or behave in so oppressive a manner as to justify his expulsion. When the decision of the makota regarding the choice or expulsion of a ruler was not unanimous it often resulted in factional violence between 28 See Angolana (Documentafao Sobre Angola), I (I783-I883), ed. Mario Ant6nio
Fernandes de Oliveira (Lisboa, I968), i88. 30 See, for example, a letter of the makota of soba Ndumbu a Pepu to the governorgeneral, Mar. I876, a copy of which was published in 0 Cruzeiro do Sul, no. 223, which stated that '. . .the uses and customs of the sobado Dumbo Apepo, handed down and preserved since remotest antiquity, give to the macotas the right of electing the soba from among the relatives of the deceased ruler. . .'. Political attitudes among the western Mbundu regarding the holding of political power by females seem to have differed from those of eastern Mbundu tribes, at least by the nineteenth century. In the concelho of Cambambe by I870 the election of women as sobas was a fairly common practice in a number of sobados: compare, for example, J. C. Miller, 'Nzinga of Matamba in a New rival contenders for the sobado. The resulting political instability usually embraced a far wider area than the sobado immediately concerned, through the loyalties produced by a complex kinship structure linking the lineage groups of several sobados. In the concelho of Cambambe such situations were often further aggravated by the incompetence or corruption of local colonial officials and by the vacillation of the Luanda government.32 The frequent political conflicts among the Mbundu subject to Portuguese rule in the nineteenth century prompted more than one local administrator to urge the extinction of the sobados.33 But the preservation of African political structures was essential to the maintenance of Portuguese rule over a population whose passive acceptance of colonial authority sprang from its traditional customary obedience to elected sobas.34
The nature of a soba's relationship with the Portuguese government was theoretically defined in the ceremony of undamento. This confirmed the election of a new soba and signified his acceptance by the colonial administration. The ceremony was performed by the chief and his makota in the presence of the administrator of the concelho. It took the form of a declaration of loyalty to the Portuguese and belief in Catholic faith by the new ruler, who also promised to fulfil certain obligations towards the colonial government, such as payment of taxes and provision of men for the army or labour services. In return the Portuguese government undertook to protect and defend the new soba against unjustified deposition from within the sobado, or against attack from without.35
In practice, for much of the nineteenth century, the relationship of the Portuguese with black potentates in the interior of Angola was conditioned chiefly by the penury and consequent military and administrative weakness of the government. Colonial authority remained heavily dependent on the loyalty of influential African rulers, whose continuing power made them potentially overmighty subjects: in this respect Portuguese rule was probably little different from that of other European powers in Africa at this date. It was a policy further dictated in Angola by widespread corruption among colonial administrators in the interior and by the contempt of successive governor-generals for the low social origin and behaviour of many white settlers. At least until the i88os the Portuguese government was both unable and unwilling to change this situation by spending the money and manpower necessary to bring about a deepening of administrative control.36 32 Evidence for this comes from the avulsos and codices relating to the concelho of Cambambe in the AHA, particularly between I876 and i886.
33 See, for example, AHA, c6dice 2-4-I8, oficio no. 210, chefe of Cambambe to the governor-general, 22 Sept. I856; c6dice 5-6-36, oficio no 6o6, ibid. 8 Nov. 1884. By the middle of the nineteenth century the largest and most populous sobado in the concelho of Cambambe was acknowledged to be Kabuku Kambilo.37 Its territorial jurisdiction extended from the banks of the Lukala, in the north, southwards as far as the river Mukoso.38 The dominant political influence of the sobado at this date was a result not only of its large population and consequent superior military power, but also of the favour and support it received from the Portuguese government. The loyalty of successive rulers to the Portuguese was already wellestablished by the end of the eighteenth century, when they were apparently willing agents of Portuguese advance in the interior of Angola.39 In return the colonial government appointed chiefs of Kabuku Kambilo to top positions of command in the guerra preta. 40 The height of Kabuku's political power and prestige seems to have been reached in the I850s. In I855 'Dembo'41 Kabuku Kambilo, baptized Dom Francisco Andre Fernandes Torres, captain-major of the guerar 41 Written as 'Dembo' in Portuguese sources, this was apparently an honorary title commonly used by the Portuguese from the seventeenth century onwards when addressing or referring to powerful chiefs. However, one nineteenth-century source also alleges that the rulers of Kabuku Kambilo derived their title actually from the chiefs called Ndembu, in the region of Kazu a Ngongo (Cazuangongo), from whom they claimed descent: see AHA, avulsos, maco I6-I-7, petition of soba Ndumbu a Pepu to the governor-general, In the I870s much of the trade flowing between Dondo and the regions to the north of the Lukala was intercepted and regulated by Kabuku as it passed through the lands under his jurisdiction: he collected the rents and taxes imposed on traders at three feiras which had grown up at points along the route between Dondo and the margin of the Lukala47; he also claimed exclusive control of the ferry service over the Lukala on the road between Dondo and Caculo, the commercial and administrative centre of Cazengo. In I872 a government decree had abolished the official tax imposed on all who passed across rivers within concelhos under Portuguese authority. In the concelho of Cambambe, however, this revenue continued 45 The little which is known of Kabuku's lineage and kinship relationships suggests that they covered a wide area, including several powerful sobas in neighbouring concelhos, for example, a 'father-in-law', soba Kakulu Kamuinsa of Cazengo, and a 'grandson', soba Hebo a Kimbi of Massangano. Kabuku also claimed kinsmen among the unsubdued African rulers on the periphery of Portuguese rule, among the Ndembu and Jinga, to the north and north-east of Cazengo.
46 Dom Antonio was unable to speak or write Portuguese. Throughout his long career as soba his relations with the colonial government were conducted through interpreters and secretaries, who were sometimes also his close relatives.
47 Mukoso, Kangongui and Lukala. These may have grown up at natural resting-points for trading caravans. A description of the feira of Mukoso in I884 appears in Carvalho, Viagem, i, I io-i i. These three feiras remained under Kabuku's exclusive control until I894: see AHA, avulsos, mayo i6-7-4, secretary-general to the chefe of Cambambe, 28 May I894.
to be collected on the Lukala as the personal tribute of Kabuku: he provided two canoes to ferry passengers across the river and appointed his own nominee to collect the tax. This was done with the full knowledge, if not the official sanction, of the colonial government. Kabuku maintained his monopoly through the violent intimidation of potential rivals and by I876 was alleged to be exacting three times the amounts formerly taxed on persons and cargoes crossing the river. It was to the proceeds of this tribute in particular that contemporaries attributed Kabuku's notorious wealth and grandeur.48 As long as Portuguese authority lacked force and the colonial administration in the interior remained weak, Kabuku was able to maintain and extend his power. Between I875 and i88o, aided by his kinsmen, he adopted a policy of armed aggression against neighbouring sobados: in I877 he forcibly reinstated a 'nephew' as ruler in Mbumba a Kisansu59; a year later he assisted a 'grandson', soba Huachila a Mbanza60 of Libolo, to invade Ngola Kalunga, an important sobado dominating crossing points on the Kwanza used by Bailundu traders and carregadores6l; at this time also he may have violently acquired exclusive control of the feira of Nhangui a Pepi, on the road between Pungu a Ndongo and Dondo.62 During these years Kabuku imposed his political control both within Kabuku Kambilo and elsewhere by means of large bands of armed 'slaves' resident in his mbanza, whose fame inspired terror and panic throughout the concelho.63 Finally, in i88o, his activities brought him into open conflict with European commercial interests, provoking two major crises which forced the Luanda government to clarify its policy in relation to Kabuku. Tension between Kabuku and the white fazendeiros and traders of Dondo and Cazengo had been building up for several years over the Lukala ferry. By i88o Kabuku probably controlled most of the points of passage across the Lukala between Cambambe and Cazengo either directly, or indirectly through close relatives.64 European traders protested publicly against his monopoly, complaining bitterly of the extortions and robberies practised on people and goods crossing the river and of the ruined state of the canoes provided by the soba for the service.65 Kabuku's principal opponents were young men, of short residence in Angola. In most cases only a few years, or even months, had sufficed for the accumulation of the wealth which had brought them social and political standing among the trading communities of the interior. Their ruthless trading acumen took little account of African interests: indeed, to such men the 59 AHA, avulsos, mavo 23-3-2, Kabuku to the chefe of Cambambe, 7 Nov. I877. 63 See, for example, AHA, avulsos, maco I6-1-7, chefe of Cambambe to the secretarygeneral, 24 June I875. Kabuku's military power was increased in this period by a government order to place a detachment of soldiers from the Dondo garrison in his mbanza, under his command as colonel of the guerra preta: see AHA, c6dice 6-i-io, offcio no. These attitudes were sharpened by fear when Kabuku's attempts to expand his territorial power north of the Lukala briefly threatened the survival of white plantation owners in Cazengo. Conflict arose from Kabuku's efforts to obtain, as his inheritance, a coffee plantation which was also claimed by a European trader, Augusto Fernandes de Freitas,67 in satisfaction of a debt. An open and violent struggle between the two claimants had continued for five years when finally, early in i88o, Kabuku suddenly massed hundreds of armed followers along the left margin of the Lukala, intending, so it was rumoured, to invade Cazengo and reclaim his inheritance by force. His action aroused much panic among Europeans in Cazengo: at this date the racial tension generated by land disputes in that concelho threatened daily to explode in revolt against the colonial government itself. Kabuku's political dominance in the Lukala region and his control of the river ports gave him great prestige and influence among the angry population of the northern bank: as his followers massed along the Cambambe side of the river the people of Cazengo flocked to meet them, clamouring for Kabuku's aid in driving the white fazendeiros from the concelho.68
White fears were temporarily allayed by the unexpectedly swift convergence of government forces on Cazengo, which rapidly induced the assembled crowd to disperse. Returning to his mbanza, Kabuku vehemently denied that he had intended to promote rebellion: '. . . Yes, I am soba and black', he stated afterwards in a dignified letter addressed to the governor-general, 'but. . . my ideas were never subversive and I pride myself on having been always loyal to the flag, that was my cradle, and of helping it in its most critical crises ...69 Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of Portuguese military and administrative weakness, the governorgeneral, Vasco Guedes Carvalho e Menezes, allowed himself to be convinced. Seeing that reliance on the corrupt white administration of Cazengo could only bring further deterioration in social and political 67 Freitas was a native of Madeira who had arrived in Angola some time during the I86os. His career was typical of that of a successful white trader in Angola at this time: a lesser member of the Dondo trading community in I868, he had soon become active in Cazengo as the agent of a Luanda trading firm and by I875 owned property there. He was several times accused of illegal extortions of land and even murder, charges which were never examined, due to his close intimacy with successive colonial administrators and his own position as a colonial official. His conflict with Kabuku can be traced in AHA, avulsos, maco I8-2-3, passim., c6dice B-20-2 (G. 52, no. 209), oficio no. 278; During the months which succeeded this crisis, Kabuku was assured of government protection by an order forbidding the Dondo administration from proceeding further against him.77 These months probably saw the peak of his prestige and political power: by i882 about half of the twentynine sobas in the concelho of Cambambe were his close relatives or dependants; he was openly acknowledged as the 'first authority' among the sobas of that jurisdiction; and his mbanza served as a high court for the arbitration and settlement of disputes among chiefs as far distant as 73 In I879 Salles Ferreira had led an independent government commission which had attempted to provide a just solution to the land questions pending between Africans and Europeans in Cazengo. Throughout i88o outraged white fazendeiros had tried hard to convince the Luanda government that Kabuku was planning a full-scale revolt against the Portuguese, aided by sobas from the Duque de Bragan9a region, to the north-east of Cazengo. Perhaps on the advice of Salles Ferreira-who sent Kabuku secret warning of these accusations-the governor-general personally reassured Kabuku that he would never attach any importance to the intrigues of his enemies: see Boletim Official de Angola, I88o, no. ii, Portaria no. 17, 29 Jan. i88o; AHA, c6dice 32-1-46, oficios nos. io8, II0, 134, May-June i88o; Angolana, I, 452-3. 74 The withdrawal of government protection after i882 coincided with serious political dissension within Kabuku Kambilo itself, threatening the sobado with disintegration. In I884 armed revolt broke out against Kabuku, led by a faction of his own makota and village headmen. This was immediately occasioned by opposition to the hut tenth tax, or decima predial, reimposed by the Portuguese in a modified form in i 880.80 But its roots may have lain in deeper political tension created by Kabuku's attempts to extend a despotic control over affairs both within his sobado and elsewhere.
It is not implausible to speculate that the close domination of ports and markets by Kabuku and his close relatives during the previous decade of commercial expansion in the concelho had stimulated resentment and discontent among rival lineages and bred a desire to overthrow the royal dynasty. As the revolt reached its height a group of leading rebel makota refused to recognize the supremacy of Kabuku's mbanza, claiming to have redivided the territory of the sobado among themselves.8' 93 The population of Kabuku Kambilo may have shared the same fate as that of bordering sobados along the Lukala, Kabuku Ka Ndala a Kitanda (Cabouco Candalla Aquitanda) and Mubanga a Tutu, which were reported to have been almost wholly wiped out by sleeping sickness in April I899: see AHA, avulsos, maco I6-9-4, commando do Nhangue Apepe, offcio no. 66, IS Apr. I899.
